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[L. A. No. 23197. In Bank. Jan. 28, 1955.]

1rI & 1rI LIVESTOCK TRANSPORT COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA AUTO TRANSPORT COMPANY et al., Defendants; WALTER
ALVES et at, Appellants.
[L. A. No. 23198. In Bank. Jan. 28, 1955.]

VERN BAKER, Respondent, v. WALTER ALVES et aL,
Appellants.
[1] Automobiles-Evidence-Oontributo17 NegUgence.-In action
by owner of automobile carner truck to recover for damage
to his truck when he attempted to pass to left of tractor-trailer
truck on upgrade and was struck by another truck approaching
from opposite direction, owner of carrier truck. was not contributorily negligent as matter of law where evidence showed
that his failure to pass tractor-trailer truck prior to collision
eould be attributed to the slipping of gears which was not his
fault where, as he eommenced passing, driver of tractortrailer truck pulled over to the right indicating he would have
room even if there was approaching traffic, where view was
elear for 800 feet, where grade was only S or 4 per cent and
his truck was unloaded and had previously been gaining speed,
and where he was not required to assume that approaching
'Vehicle, which weighed 65,000 pounds and was weaving from
right to left on highway while traveling downhill at about 50
miles per hour, would be travelling at such high and uncontrollabJe speed that with margin of safety, which he had with
truck he was attempting to pass, he could not complete the
passing maneuver.
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 3] Automobiles, § 256; [2] Automobiles, § 155{6).
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[2] Id.-Contributory Negligence-Overtaking and Passing.-If
truck driver made mistake in judging his ability to pass safely
another truck traveling in same direction, that would not
necessarily be contributory negligence.
[8] Id.-Evidence-Contributory Negligence.-In action by owner
of unloaded tractor truck to recover for damages to truck
when vehicle approaching from opposite direction struck automobile carrier truck, which was attempting to pass tractortrailer truck on upgrade, pushing automobile carrier truck
back until it collided with unloaded tractor truck, which was
a few feet to rear of tractor-trailer truck at time of collision,
a finding thnt driver of unloadt>d tractor truck was not guilty
of contributory negligence was sustained by evidenee from
which trier of fact could reasonably infer that he had pulled
up close behind slow-moving tractor-trailer truck with intention of passing it when highway was clear, since Veh. Code,
§ 531, providing that truck being driven on highway must be
kept at distance of at least 300 feet to rear of any vehicle immediately preceding it, expressly provides that its provisions
"shan not prevent overtaking and passing."

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Kern
County. Robert B. Lambert, Judge. Affirmed.
Actions for property damage to trucks arising out of collision of vehicles. Judgment for plaintiff in each action, affirmed.
Conron, Heard & James and Calvin H. Conron for Appellants.
Kenneth J. Thayer, Dorsett M. Phillips, William A. Kurlander and Leslie G. MacGowan for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Defendants appeal from judgments awarding plaintiffs Baker and M & :M Livestock Transport Company damages for harm to their trucks arising out of a
collision in which three other trucks were involved. The cases
were consolidated for trial by the court sitting without a
jury.
Viewing the evidence most favorable to plaintiffs the followil1g appears: The collision occurred about 2 p. m. on a
clear day on Highway 466 in the Tehachapi Mountains. The
highway ran generally in an east-west direction and was
marked with a broken center line. At the point of impact
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d. Automouiles,
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138; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 33.
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it was about 34 feet wide including the shoulders, and on
each side there was a steep embankment to a ravine below.
'fhe upgrade to the east was estimated variously at 3 p('r
cent to 6% per cent.
Before the collision, three trucks averaging 60 feet in
length and 8 feet in width, were proceeding upgrade in the
eastbound lane. The first was the Automobile Forwarding
Service Truck, a two-ton tractor-trailer loaded with four cars,
which was driven by Charles French in its proper lime at 7
to 8 miles an hour. Behind French was plaintiff Baker's
truck, a top-type automobile carrier truck, which was unloaded. Following Baker was plaintiff M & M Livestock
Transport Company's unloaded tractor-truck driven by Curtis
Lacert.
Prior to the collision Baker had been ascending the grade
at about 32 miles per hour and he was able to accelerate
his speed on the grade and was doing so. Thus there was
evidence that Baker's truck was. capable of passing French'8
truck safely considering the extent of the view ahead. When
Baker pulled up behind French and commenced his maneuver
to pass French, the latter veered sharply to the right as far
as his truck would go and onto the shoulder, thus leaving
about 9 feet between the left side of his truck and the center
line. When Baker was passing on French's lefthand side he
was going about 15 miles per hour. The right side of Baker's
truck was 1 to 2 feet from the left side of French's. Although Baker testified he estimated the left side of his truck
was about 2 feet to the left of the center line, it could have
been on or to the right of the center line on the basis of the
above figures. When he started to make the passing maneuver,
Baker had a clear view of the road ahead for 800 feet to a
point where the road curved. No one was approaching from
the east. While passing, Baker's truck "faltered" or
"stopped" as described by various witnesses. That was due
to a slipping of the gears which he had had repaired immediately before the trip on which he was driving when the
collision occurred. When the tractor portion of Baker's truck
(20 feet long) and 2 feet of the trailer had passed French,
a truck owned by defendant Alves and driven by defendant
Madrid rounded the curve between 400 and 500 feet away,
travelling west toward Baker and French at a speed of 50
or 60 miles per hour. Madrid's truck weaved from right to
left on the highway and finally collided with the right front
end of Baker's truck and left front of French's truck, the
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latter two trucks having stopped. Madrid's truck weighed
65,000 pounds and was travelling downhill. Apparently he
had little control over it. It was going 50 miles per hour
a.t the time of the impact.
Baker'8 truck was pushed back until it collided with the
M & M truck. A moment later a second truck owned by
tlefendant Alves and driven by defendant Gonzales came
round the same curve from the east and, being unable to stop,
skidded into the first Alves truck and turned over. The
trucks caught fire, but the drivers escaped uninjured.
Defendants assert the plaintiff Baker was contributively
negligent as a matter of law in that he violated section 530
of the Vehicle Code.· No contention is made that defendants
were not negligent.
As we read section 530, it requires that when passing, the
view of the road and distance ahead of oncoming traffic be
such that the passing maneuver may be made with safety
and that the passing shall not be done on a curved road
where, to do so, creates a hazard; it does not mean that when
passing the conditions must be such that the passer guarantees
he may safely pass or that he has necessarily violated the
section by failing to complete the maneuver without accident,
that is, the question is not entirely one of hindflght. Essentially the passer is required to act in a reasonable and prudent
manner under the circumstances such as are presented in
this case.
[1] To say that under the foregoing circumstances Baker
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law is not sustained by the record. The trial court was justified in finding,
as it did, that Baker was not guilty of contributory negligence which proximately contributed to the collision. It is
." (a) [ ••• Ret-u.rn to right-hand side.] Except when a roadway
has Leen divided into three traffic lanes. no vehicle shall be driven to the
left side of the center line of a roadway in overtaking and passing
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless such left side is
elearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance
ahead to permit such overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering with tho safe operation of any vehiclo approaching from
the oPPol:litc diroction or any vchicle oYcrtal(en. In every event the over·
taking velJiclc must I'cturn to the right-hand side of the roadway beforo
coming within one hundred feet of any vehicle approaching from the
opposite direction.
"(b) No vehicle shall at any time be driven to the left side of the
roadway under the following condition s:
"1. When approaching tile crest of a grade or upon a curve in the
highway where the driver's view is obstructed within such distance
as to create a hazard in thc c\'cut another vehicle mlght approach from
the opposite direction." (Veh. Code, t 530.)
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true that. Baker dill 11\11 sllcc(>('d ill g"et.l ill~~ pm:l I"n'll.·I, :1I,d
ahead of him on the righl. sid!' of the road 111'1"111"1' Madrid
came within collision Jistall·:e. It may be that that failure
is some indication that it was not safe for Baker to attempt
to pass but his failure could be attributed to the slipping
of the gears which was not his fault. In any case, however.
we look at the situation as it appeared to a man of ordinary
prudence at the time Baker commenced to pass French. As
he commenced passing, French pulled over to the right indicating he would have room even if there was approaching
traffic. The view was clear for 800 feet. The grade was only
3 per cent or 4 per cent and his truck was unloaded and had
been previously gaining speed. As a person of ordinary
prudence he was justified in assuming he could pass
safely. He was not required to assume that an approaching
vehicle 800 feet away would be travelling at such high and
uncontrollable (considering the weight of Madrid's truck)
speed that with that margin of safety he could not complete
the passing maneuver. (See Leo v. Dunham, 41 Cal.2d 712,
715 [264 P.2d 1].) Certainly the question was one for the
finder of fact, the trial court in the instant case. [2] Even
if Baker made a mistake in judging his ability to pass safely,
that would not necessarily be contributory negljgence. (65
C.J.S., Negligence, § 2; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 33.) The
question of whether a man of ordinary prudence would have
endeavored to pass is peculiarly a question for the trier of
fact as it involves an exercise of judgment probably more
difficult than any other conduct in driving a motor vehicle.
"But cases in which it can be said that the negligence of
plaintiff contributes proximately to the accident as a matter
of law are rare. The rule has been stated in various ways in
a legion of cases, that contributory negligence is not established as a matter of law unless the only reasonable hypothesis
is that such negligence exists; that reasonable or sensible men
could have drawn that conclusion and none other; that where
there are different inferences that may be drawn, one for and
one against, the one against will be followed; and that before
it can be held as a matter of law that contributory negligence exists, the evidence must point unerringly to that conclusion. (See Johnson v. Southern Pacific OQ., 154 Cal.
285 [97 P. 520]; Wise v. Stott, 114 Cal. App. 702 [300
P. 883]; Heitman v. Pacific Electric Ry. 00., 10 Cal.App.
397 [102 P. 15] ; Daly v. Hinz, 113 Cal. 366 [45 P. 693];
Bobinet v. Hawks, 200 Cal 265 [252 P. 1045]; McVea v.
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Nickols, 10;') Cal.App. 28 [286 P. 761] ; Schneider v. Market
Rt1'eet Ry. Co., 134 Cal. 482 [66 P. 734] ; Walker v. Southern
Pac. Co., 38 Cal.App. 377 1176 P. 175J j Zibbell v. Southern
Pac. Co., 160 Cal. 237 [116 P. 513] j Moss v. H. R. Boynton
Co., 44 Cal.App. 474 [186 P. 631] j Green v. Southern Pac.
Co., 53 Cal.App. 194 [199 P. 1059]; Kienlen v. Holt, 106
Cal.App. 135 [288 P. 866] ; Grimes v. Richfield Oil Co., 106
Cal.App. 416 [289 P. 245] ; Schellin v. North Alaska Salmon
Co., 167 Cal. 103 [138 P. 723] ; Reaugh v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 189 Cal. 335 f208 P. 125] ; Smith v. Southern Pac. Co.,
201 Cal. 57 [255 P. 500] ; Flores v. Fitzgerald, 204 Cal. 374
[268 P. 369] ; Toschi v. Christian, 24 Ca1.2d 354 [149 P.2d
848].)" (Anthony v. Hobbie, 25 Ca1.2d 814, 818 [155 P.2d
826].) The cases cited by defendants are distinguishable.
[3] Defendants' contention that contributory negligence
must be imputed to M & M Livestock Transport Company,
because Lacert was violating section 531 of the Vehicle Code·
at the time of the collision, cannot be sustained. Section 531
provides that a truck being driven on a highway must be
kept at a distance of at least 300 feet to the rear of any
vehicle immediately preceding it. The evidence is clear that
the M & M truck was within a few feet of the rear of French's
truck at the time of the collision, but section 531 expressly
provides that its provisions "shall not prevent overtaking and
passing. • . ." The trier of fact could reasonably infer that
Lacert had pulled up close behind the slow-moving truck
driven by French with the intention of passing it when the
highway was clear. The evidence therefore supports the finding that Lacert was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The judgments are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-I agree that the evidence does not show,
as a matter of law, any negligence of Baker proximately
contributing to his injury. However, I do not agree with the
construction which has been placed upon section 530 of the
Vehicle Code.
That statute defines the situation in which it is lawful to
." (B) The driver ot any motor truck, or the driver ot any motor
vellicle which is drawing or towing another vehicle, upon a roadway
outside of a business or residence district shall keep the vehicle he is
driving at a distance ot not less than 300 feet to the rear of any vehicle
immediately preceding it being drinm in the same direction. The provisions of this subdivl:.;lon shall llot prevent overtakini and pasl'
ini•••• "
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attempt to overtake and pass another vehicle by driving on
the left side of the center line. This may be done when the
left side is free from oncoming traffic "for a sufficient dis·
tance ahead to permit such overtaking and passing to be
completely made without interfering with the safe operation
of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction or any
vehicle overtaken." (Subd. (a).) The next sentence reads:
"In every event the overtaking vehicle must return to the
right-hand side of the roadway before coming within one
hundred feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction." The holding that the passer need only "act in a
reasonable and prudent manner under the circumstances such
as are presented in this case" gives no effect to the "t.andaril
of care required by the Legislature.
In Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School D·ist., 29 Ca1.2d 58i
[177 P.2d 279], we said: "[T]he proper conduct of a reasonable person under particular situations may become settled
by judicial decision or be prescribed by statute or ordinance
• ,,0 An act or failure to act beiow the statutory standard
is negligence per se, or negligence as a matter of law. And
if the evidence establishes that the plaintiff's or defendant's
violation of the statute or ordinance proximately caused the
injury and no excuse or justification for violation is shown
by the evidence, responsibility may be fixed upon the violator
without other proof of failure to exercise due care. (Citations.) However, in an emergency, or under unusual conditions, it is generally held that circumstances may be shown
to excuse the violation. ... [T]he fact which will excuse
the violation of a statute has been defined by the court as one
resulting 'from causes or things beyond the control of the
person charged with the violation. t (Citations.) . . .. In the
application of this rule each violation of a statutory requirement must be considered in connection with the surrounding
circumstances. Ordinarily, the excuse relied upon by the
violator presents a question of fact for the jury's determination." (Pp. 587-590.) The principles stated and applied in
the Satterlee case were followed in Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal.
2d 474, 480 [218 P.2d 531].
Without question, Baker failed to return to his proper lane
"before coming within one hundred feet of any vehicle approaching" and presumptively was negligent. However, a
proper disposition of the case requires a determination as
to whether Baker's conduct was exell~ed and, if not, whether
his negligence contributed to the inj Ui'.,y.
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With regard to the first issue, there is evidence that when
Bakel' drove out of his lane to pass, the truck preceding him
pulled onto the shoulder to its right, leaving sufficient room
to pass in the right-hand lane without crossing the center
line. The testimony also shows a mechanical failure in
Baker's truck while he was attempting to pass, that Madrid
approached at an excessive rate of speed and driving in an
erratic manner, and that the truck preceding Baker had
stopped at the time of the impact. It may btl inferred from
this eviden~e that Baker was excused from returning to his
proper lane because of a combination of the excessive speed
of Madrid's vehicle and Baker's inability either to fall behind the preceding truck because it had stopped or to get
ahead of it because of the mechanieal failure in his own truck.
But even if Baker's violation of the statute was not justified,
I do not believe there is any basis for holding, as a matter of
law, that his negligence proximately contributed to the accident. The record shows that Madrid's truClk was veering from
side to side and had crossed the center line sufficiently to
strike not only Baker's vehicle but the one preceding him,
which admittedly was ill the proper lane. Although Madrid's
truck may have swerved because of the application of brakes
and the driver's attempt to avoid a collision, the trier of fact
reasonably might have found that it was so far out of control when rounding the curve as to collide with BaIH'r's
vehicle. The latter was entirely within its proper lane, or
two or three feet to the left of the center line as the record
seems to indicate.
I, therefore, concur in affirming the judgment in its entirety.
Schauer, J., concurred.
TRA YNOR, J., Dissenting.-I agree that the judgment in
favor of plaintiff M & M Livestock Trallsport Co. should be
affirmed, but I cannot agree that plaintiff Baker was not contributively negligent as a matter of law.
Section 530 of the Vehicle Code provides not only that
overtaking and passing shall be "com pletely made with on t
interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction or any vehicle overtaken,"
but that" In every eve11t the overtaking vehicle must return
to the right-hand side of the roadway before coming within
one hundred feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction." (Italics added.) Thus, even if "safe operation"

.Tan.
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in the first clause llll'(lIIS what a f('us(luahl,v prudent driver
would regard as "saf~ npf'ralion," the standard of care required by the second clause is not what the reasonably prudent driver would do under the circumstances but what the
Legislature has commanded, namely, that thc driver of an
overtaking vehicle return to the right-hand side of the roadway within the distance prescribed unless prevented froll
doing so by " 'causes or things beyond [his] control .... '"
(Ornales v. W1'gger, 35 Ca1.2d 474, 479 [218 P.2d 531J.)
Baker did not return to the right hand side of the roadway
within the distance prescribed. Nor could he have done so
even if his gears had not slipped or if French had not stopped
his truck. It is undisputed that those incidents occurred
simultaneously with the appearance of defendant's truck
round the curve. The evidence viewed most favorably to
Baker clearly shows that, even if the gears had not slipped
and F'rench had not stopped, Baker could not have completed
the passing maneuver or fallen behind French and thus returned to the right-hand side of the roadway within 100 feet
of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction even
at a speed of only 55 miles an hour. (See Veh. Code, § 511.)
To leave to the trier of fact the question whether Baker's
violation of the statute was excused, i.e., whether he could
reasonably believe that he could pass without crossing the
center line or return to his proper lane without endangering
oncoming traffic, is to substitute for the statutory rule the
view of the trier of fact as to what constitutes reasonablp conduct. (See my concurring opinion in Satterlee v. Orange
Glenn School Dist., 29 Ca1.2d 581,594 [177 P.2d 279].)
I find no evidence in the record to support the conclusion
that the accident would have occurred even if Baker had
not attempted his ill-fated passing maneuver. The evidence
clearly shows that Madrid was in control of his truck and
was in his proper lane until he rounded the curve, saw Baker '8
truck in a position of danger, and applied his brakes in an
attempt to avoid the collision, There can be no doubt that
Baker's violation of the statute was a substantial factor in
bringing about the collision and was, therefore, a contributing
cause thereof.
Spence, J" concurred.
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